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Introduction 
Demonetisation has been the contentious issue in Indian politics ever since the Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, declared that Rs 500 and Rs 1000 notes would cease to be legal tenders from midnight of 8th 
Nov 2016. Demonetisation or the withdrawal of form of currency from circulation is nothing unique as many 
countries have done it. In 2002 the nations of the European Union began to use to common currency of Euro 
and demonetised the old national currencies such as mark, franc and lira. In 2015, Zimbabwe demonetized 
its currency in response to hyperinflation. The Indian exercise, however, stands distinct to other economies 
due to the suddenness of the decision as the declaration and its implementation occurred in a matter of 
hours. The abruptness was compounded by the volume of the exercise as 86 percent of all legal tender in the 
country was demonetised and cash transactions constituted nearly 80 percent of all economic transactions 
in the country (Ghosh 2016). Naturally the decision and its implications have dominated political and 
electoral discourse of the country (Express Web Desk 2016).  
This paper of attempts to provide an overview of the politics associated with demonetisation in 
India. It presents the experience of demonetisation along with the various narratives, both in favour and 
against, the move of demonetisation. Interestingly the debate surrounding demonetization has been largely 
confined to the cost benefit analysis, and economic merit-demerit.  This paper shifts the focus from 
economic to political dimensions of demonetisation and argues that in the absence of comprehensible 
economic consequences, the narrative of demonetisation is dominantly constructed by political parties. 
Although demonetization is essentially an economic instrumentality, in the Indian context it has been 
reduced to purely political rhetoric. 
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Demonetisation experience in India 
In economic literature demonetisation is presented as a measure to combat corruption (tax 
evasion), fake currency, inflation and to facilitate cash less transaction and trade. The Government of India 
also broadly presented the same reasons behind its decision of demonetisation. The Government justified 
the move as part of its battle against corruption to limit parallel economy, prevent counterfeit currency, 
curbing subversive activities and increasing tax revenue (Express Web Desk 2016).  
India’s tax compliance has been historically very poor with large scale evasion. In 2012-13 only 4 
percent of the 760 million adults (enumerated in 2011 census) filed Income tax returns and more than half 
of the 29 million individual tax payers paid no tax. In the financial year  2012-13 just around 18000 
individuals declared incomes above 10 million and direct taxes contributed only 51 percent of tax revenue in 
2015-16 (Editorial 2016). The argument of demonetisation as a measure to prevent tax evasion has received 
support from business leaders and banks like A. Bhattacharya of State Bank of India, Narayan Murthy of 
Infosys, and International agencies like International Monetary Fund (ANI 2016, Express Web Desk 2016).  
As some financial experts predict the move will have strong 'formalisation effect' and nearly half of 
the non-tax paying businesses in the informal sector will become unviable and cede market shares to the 
organised sector (Worstall 2016). It is also expected that given the huge inflow of capital into banks, lending 
interest rates would decline that may have a stimulatory effect on economic growth in the long run. 
Empirically, demonetisation has forced people to deposit money into the banks with long queues noted 
across the country. 
In this narrative the non-deposit of unaccounted currency has emerged as a key political issue. 
During demonetization it was claimed that the government would gain a windfall profit due to non-deposit 
of some amount of black money for fear to sanction. According to statements, the government expected 
around Rs 4- 6 trillion not to return to the banks. This amount once transferred to the government by the 
Central Bank would enable tax cuts, bank recapitalisation and infrastructure spending (Roychoudhury 
2016). It is noteworthy that even after 100 days and the presentation of the national budget the government 
has not  disclosed the amount of non-deposited currency. News reports however, suggest that around 97 per 
cent of currency notes, outlawed by the government have returned to banks raising serious questions on the 
short term benefits of demonetisation (Express Web Desk 2017). 
Critics have also raised questions about fake currency as a reason for demonetisation. According to 
the Reserve Bank of India data only seven notes in every million were detected as fake in 2015-16. In terms 
of value, the fake notes constituted Rs 296.4 million in value out of the total Rs16.41 trillion worth currency 
in circulation (IANS 2016). This amounts to a miniscule .0018 percent of the total value of currency and 
demonetisation of entire currency is akin to throwing the baby with the bathwater. Even the most 
conservative estimates of genuine currency notes suggest that only 250 notes in every million are fake (joint 
study by the Indian Statistical Institute and National Investigation Agency).  
In contrast to the gains associated with demonetisation, the detrimental effects in the form of 
severe cash shortages for small businesses, agriculture, transportation and the informal sector have been 
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immediate. People seeking to exchange their notes had to stand in lengthy queues, a process by made 
challenging by inefficient planning and unequal banking access (IANS 2016). As pointed out by several 
prominent economists over 90 percent of all transactions in India are conducted in cash, and over 85 
percent of workers get their incomes in cash which made the impact all pervasive (Ghosh 2016). The number 
of deaths associated with demonetisation (either due to lack of medical help due to cash shortage or death 
due to stress of queueing for withdrawal from banks) has touched the three digit figure (Worstall 2016). 
At a macro-economic level both growth and investment have been adversely affected due to 
demonetisation. Equity research firms have estimated that the liquidity crisis will result in GDP growth 
decline between 0.5 percent to 2 percent in the fiscal year (Worstall 2016). All evidence, except for 
government records (the government changed the calculation of GDP) corroborates decline in industrial 
investment and growth. According to reports in Indian Express Newspaper (2017) average investment 
declined from 20.97 billion rupees during the 39 pre-demonetisation days (October 1 through November 8) 
to 8.24 billion during the post-demonetisation period (Nov 9 to Dec 31).  
It is noteworthy that prominent economists have repeatedly questioned efficacy of demonetisation 
as a measure to control black money as it addresses only the stock of cash black money but not the 
unaccounted assets or the flow of black money. Even the Black Money Committee Report (2012) of 
Government of India recommended against demonetisation for curbing black money. Corroborating such 
arguments the income tax searches in 2012-13 yielded less than 6 percent of undisclosed income in the form 
of cash (Suresh 2017). As such the efficacy of demonetisation as a step against black money has been 
seriously undermined.  
People have also questioned the policy from the philosophical standpoint of sanctity of private 
property and choice. Steve Forbes of the famous Forbes magazine has labelled the decision as ‘sickening and 
immoral and called it a ‘massive theft of people’s property’(FE Online 2016). News such as BJP state unit 
depositing cash just before demonetisation in West Bengal  (Express News Service 2016) or investing in land 
in Bihar (Gupta 2016) have further raised questions about the impartiality of the process.  
Intuitively the cost of demonetisation till now, far outweighs the benefits. The visible benefit has 
been the fillip to cash less transactions in the economy. The demand for point of sales (POS) machines and 
transactions through E-payment options have increased significantly (Economic Times 2016). According to 
data of Pine Labs, the debit card transactions rose by 108 percent and credit card transactions by 60 percent 
on 9 November 2016. Undeniably this is a move towards greater formalisation of economic transactions. In 
contrast, the cost of the process has been enormous, at least in economic terms. According to CMIE just the 
cost of withdrawing 500 and 1000 currency notes was conservatively around 1.28 trillion rupees till 
December 30, the deadline set for currency swap by the government. This cost is likely to go up over time 
due to the overall loss  of liquidity, broken supply chains and loss of confidence in consumers (ET Bureau 
2016).  
Surprisingly the political cost of the move has been favourable for the Prime Minister and the 
government. Since demonetisation the incumbent centre wing BhartiyaJanta Party (BJP) has formed 
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government in 4 out of the 5 sub-national states that went to polls. This success comes close on the heels of 
victory in the civic polls in Odisha, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Chandigarh. In Chandigarh the BJP won 20 out 
of total 26 seats, in Maharashtra BJP increased its seat tally from 25 seats to 119, in Gujarat BJP maintained 
its lead on 23 out of 31 other seats of various municipalities, and panchayats, and in Rajasthan the party 
won 19 seats out of 37 seats (Shekhar 2016). A natural question in this context is how despite the apparent 
limitations of demonetisation in economic domain and hardships for the common people, the government 
and the Prime Minister can elicit political mileage and electoral success.   
Interestingly in the available narrative on demonetisation, the political dimension of the process 
has remained relatively unexplored. Questions about political strategy behind the decision has not been 
interrogated adequately . Such questions are necessitated by the fact that incumbent BJP has largely been 
identified as the party of upper caste, traders-small and middle-level businessmen (Chhibber 1997). The 
move has implications for business especially small and medium ones in the short run, and betrays the 
political decision making horizon (gains in long term future with immediate costs).  
 
Politics of demonetisation 
The decision of demonetisation has been contested and divisive. The winter session of the 
parliament saw little work due to protests by opposition, a Bharat bandh (All India strike) called by Left 
parties (HT Correspondents 2016) along with spate of protests across the country (Daniyal 2016). As the 
economic gains from demonetisation remain unsure, it is the political narrative of the process that has 
acquired prominence.  
In this battle of political narratives, Prime Minister Modi and the government have positioned 
demonetisation at a moral plane as a battle against corruption. People sympathetic to Narendra Modi argue 
that the idea of demonetisation in principle was necessary and difficult, but it was marred by inept 
implementation and corruption. The upsurge in Jan-Dhan accounts (zero balance accounts opened by the 
government for the poor) post demonetisation is alleged to be one of means of money laundering. The 
implementation of demonetisation however reveals flaws in policy beyond adoption of unscrupulous means 
by people such as difference in the size of currencies requiring recalibration of ATMS, and inadequate 
currency printing leading to severe inconvenience. Critics have argued that these point to the lack of policy 
analysis, cost-benefit analysis, or consideration of alternative policy. 
 
Decision of demonetisation 
 Intuitively, the policy of demonetisation, as it has unfolded is more a political process than a 
considered economic calculus. The gain from the demonetisation exercise, particularly to the Prime 
Minister is more than evident. Corruption was a significant electoral issue in the 2014 elections, and one of 
the key electoral promises of Modi was to bring back black money stashed in Swiss banks. In one stroke he 
has presented himself as the leader waging a battle against corruption. The PM claimed that the difficult 
decision of demonetisation was necessitated by the inaction of all previous leaders to tackle the corrupt.  
Politics sans economics: commentary on the political economy of demonetization in India 
 
 
Rev. Conj. Aust. | Porto Alegre | v.8, n.41 | p.71-85 | abr./mai. 2017 | ISSN: 2178-8839 75 
 The move was also carefully presented as the bold and uncompromising, characteristics that 
complement the leadership style of Modi. The success of this political posturing is evident when the Prime 
Minister is hailed by Singapore-based paper The Independent as a Lee Kuan Yew to stamp out corruption in 
India (The Independent 2016).  According to noted sociologist  AsishNandy Modi is pushed by his intense 
desire to do something, to leave his mark in history and radical demonetisation could be interpreted 
through such a lens (Gopinath 2016). Modi himself has claimed that demonetisation complemented the 
swachhbharatabhiyan (clean India campaign)  as corruption, black money and terrorism are festering sores, 
holding India back in the race towards development (Knowledge@Wharton 2016).  
 The timing of the move, in the middle of the term also highlights an effort to reinvigorate the 
government and the party. Modi had promise Acche Din and Sabkasaath, sabkavikas (Prosperity and all 
round development) to all Indian through economic growth and effective governance. The first two years of 
the government however did not witness the overhauling of economic policy that Modi had promised. As 
Kala and Bellman (2016) note although the Indian economy was doing good, the strong economic 
fundamentals did little to lift corporate profits or consumer spending. The economic growth, decreasing 
inflation, and diminished fiscal deficit under the present government was largely due to the crash in crude 
oil prices. In real terms railways and ports report on good handled show a decline in tonnage and Index of 
Industrial production is near zero.  Interestingly the public banks in India have been struggling to control a 
growing mountain of bad debt. As such the move of demonetisation, with potential for windfall gains would 
have been a strategic move by the government to infuse public investment.  
 Beyond the posturing of anti-corruption and bold leadership, it is noteworthy that demonetisation 
has mirrored an effort to create new social alliances by Narendra Modi. The 2014 elections that ushered in 
the Modi government, was marked by strong inroads by the right wing BJP into rural areas, beyond its 
traditional support base among urban upper castes and middle-class voters. As Tillin (2015) points out Modi 
explicitly appealed to an inchoate group he described as India's ‘neo-middle classes’, many of whom live in 
rapidly urbanising areas. The BJP and its allies won 80 percent of the 40 most highly urbanised seats and 56 
percent of the 123 semi-urban seats. Since scope for further expansion in these sector is limited for the BJP 
expansion into rural area is the way forward for the party. As such Modi has explicitly focused on improving 
the situation in rural India and providing relief to the agricultural sector by increasing the social spending 
manifold. The idea of demonetisation as a burden on the rich and moneyed, rather than the poor has been 
invoked time and again to consolidate the coalition. 
 Chhibber and Verma (2017) point out that BJP has stitched together a social coalition of upper 
castes, other backward castes, scheduled castes and tribes by amassing voters who favour less intervention 
in the economy and conservative social values. 
 Careful observers of politics have noted the shift in patronage under the Modi government. Talukdar 
(2016) points out that Modi has reneged his promise to the urban middle class on economic reforms and 
increased tax burden on the middle class to finance increased social spending. The service tax rate was 
increased from 12.36 per cent to 15 per cent, and windfall benefits of a crash in oil prices in global markets 
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was not transferred. This abandonment of the wealthy aspiring middle class (businessmen and 
professionals) was also evident in the political message by Modi of the rich spending sleepless nights while 
the poor enjoyed during demonetisation (IANS, 2016).   
 Politically the move also resonated the strategy of conflating national interest with actions of the 
government. While announcing the demonetisation the Prime Minister projected it as a national objective 
and said that India would have to endure some hardships if it wanted to combat corruption, tax evasion and 
the menace of black money. The government’s and its advocates have projected the strains of 
demonetisation as a small price and contribution of ordinary citizens for national good. As  Tharoor (2016) 
points out the government’s assiduous public relations did its job my conflating standing in queue for 
money with soldiers standing in guard at the borders. “If our soldiers can stand for hours every day guarding 
our borders,” one popular social media meme asks, “why can’t we stand for a few hours in bank queues?” 
was a common phrase used to justify the problems associated with withdrawing cash. 
 
Politics of Opposition  
 In a liberal democracy the ability of the government to reap electoral dividends from policy despite 
failures is directly correlated to the failure of opposition parties. It is the inability of the opposition to come 
together in a united manner on the streets (despite the posturing of unity within the parliament) that 
allowed the government some breathing space after demonetisation. Expectedly the Indian National 
Congress (Congress)which was displaced by the NDA government in 2014 has opposed demonetisation. The 
mainstream Left Parties [Communist Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India, Communist Party 
(Marxist-Leninist)] have also been vocal against demonetisation. However, the national opposition parties 
could not provide any convincing counter narrative to the claims of the government. This is primarily 
because just as the policy of demonetisation was reduced to a political action by the government, the 
opposition to demonetisation was also underlined by instrumental logic of opposition.  
 Interestingly the most virulent criticism of demonetisation has emerged from regional parties 
particularly Mamata Banerjee, the Chief Minister of West Bengal and Arvind Kejriwal the Chief Minister of 
Delhi. The response of other regional parties to demonetisation has varied between complete support to 
full-fledged opposition. Among the prominent non-NDA (outside the ruling alliance) leaders the Chief 
Minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar of Janata Dal United hailed the move as a step against corruption while his 
ally Lalu Prasad Yadav of Rashtriya Janata Dal has criticised the move. The Chief Minister of Odisha, Navin 
Patnaik has endorsed the move while Tamil Nadu chief minister has maintained neutral distance. The table 
below represents a comparative statement of the position of sub-national states with reference to 
demonetisation. 
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Table 1. State wise government response to demonetization and party in power 
State  Party in power Response to Demonetisation 
Andhra Pradesh TDP (NDA) Support with some reservation 
Arunachal Pradesh PPA (NDA) Complete Support  
Assam BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Bihar JDU Complete Support  
Chhattisgarh BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Delhi AAP  Opposed  
Goa BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Gujarat BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Haryana BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Himachal Pradesh INC  (UPA) Initial support and then opposition 
Jammu & Kashmir PDP  (BJP ally) Support with some reservation 
Jharkhand BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Karnataka INC  (UPA) Opposed 
Kerala CPIM  Opposed  
Madhya Pradesh BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Maharashtra BJP  (NDA) Complete Support  
Manipur INC  (UPA) Opposed  
Meghalaya INC  (UPA) Opposed  
Mizoram INC  (UPA) Opposed  
Nagaland NFP  (NDA) Support with some reservation 
Odisha BJD Support  
Puducherry INC  (UPA) Opposed 
Punjab SAD (NDA) Support  
Rajasthan BJP  (NDA) Support  
Sikkim SDF  (NDA) Support  
Tamil Nadu AIADMK Opposed 
Telangana TRS Support with some reservation 
Tripura CPIM Opposed 
Uttar Pradesh SP Opposed 
Uttarakhand INC  (UPA) Opposed  
West Bengal TMC Opposed  
Source: Authors calculation based on news reports (Times of India, The Hindu, The Telegraph, Various Issues) 
 
 Evident from the table is the partisan support to the policy of demonetisation. Parties which are 
part of National Democratic Alliance (led by the BJP) have backed the policy with varying degree of support. 
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The opposition particularly the Congress party, the Left have opposed the policy. Interestingly some 
regional parties like JDU, BJD, TRS who are not allies of BJP have extended support to the move while AAP 
and TMC have opposed it. The varying response of the political parties, especially the opposition, reveal 
that opinion on demonetisation has been mixed which necessitate a further interrogation of party 
behaviour.  
 Intuitively demonetisation has detrimental consequences, at least in short run for the poor (mostly 
deal in cash), rural population (limited bank and cashless facilities), illiterate people (limitations in online 
transaction) and informal sector (outside the purview of regulation and likely to come under tax bracket) 
given their propensity for cash transaction. As such states with greater poverty, larger informal sectors, 
rural population and lower literacy are likely to expect greater hardship due to demonetisation. Further the 
banking infrastructure i.e. number of spread of bank branches are likely to influence the experience of 
demonetisation as difficulty in changing currency would influence perception of the process and liquidity in 
the local market.  
 The table below shows the comparative position of the major sub-national states on the relevant 
factors mentioned. These are colour coded with red indicating conditions least conducive to 
demonetisation, yellow intermediate while green highlighting most favourable conditions for 
demonetisation in a comparative vein.  The categorisation was made on the basis of measurement of mean 
and standard deviation of the individual variables. The data was collected from government records namely 
Census 2011, Handbook of Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India and Planning Commission of India.   
A cursory reading of the table reveals that some sub-national states are better equipped (economic- 
institutional) to deal with demonetization than others. Evidently states like Arunachal, Assam, Bihar 
Chhattisgarh are likely to suffer more in the context of demonetisation, while states of Delhi, Goa, 
Karnataka, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Tamil Nadu have more favourable conditions for demonetisation. The 
response of the states to demonetisation, however do corroborate to the ground realities and is largely 
explained by partisan composition of government. The opposition to demonetisation in Kerala and 
Karnataka while support in Assam, Chhattisgarh are evidently examples of such partisan behaviour.  
 Interestingly the support for demonetisation by Bihar government, although counter intuitive can 
also be explained thorough the logic of partisan interest. The present government is formed by an alliance 
of Janta Dal United headed by Nitish Kumar and Lalu Prasad Yadav led RashtriyaJanta Dal. The alliance was 
formed as an anti-BJP Mahagatbandhan (alliance) after JDU broke a 15-year alliance with BJP in 2013. The 
political support base of the JDU primarily draws on the Maha-dalits, Kurmi and other backward castes 
except Yadavs and banks on the developmental image of the Chief Minister. In contrast the RJD has support 
base among the Yadavs and Muslims and the period of RJD rule is best remembered for social empowerment 
but governance failure and massive corruption. The support for demonetization by Nitish Kumar thus 
represents a posturing that is developmental and honest, distinguishing the JDU from the RJD.  
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Table 2. State wise share of Primary sector NSDP, Literacy rate, share of unregistered manufacturing, poverty, population per bank 
branch 
State  
Primary 
Sector 
in NSDP 
Literacy 
Rates 
2011 
Unregistered 
Manufacturing  
Average 
Population 
Per Bank 
Office (000) 
Population 
Below 
Poverty 
Line) 
Party in 
power 
Andhra Pradesh 0.26 67.02 0.30 12.00 21.10 TDP 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.33 65.38 0.40 16.00 25.90 PPA 
Assam 0.22 72.19 0.28 21.00 37.90 BJP 
Bihar 0.19 61.80 0.60 24.00 53.50 JDU 
Chhattisgarh 0.22 70.28 0.11 19.00 48.70 BJP 
Delhi 0.01 86.21 0.64 8.00 14.20 AAP 
Goa 0.03 88.70 0.17 4.00 8.70 BJP 
Gujarat 0.13 78.03 0.17 13.00 23.00 BJP 
Haryana 0.16 75.55 0.28 11.00 20.10 BJP 
Himachal Pradesh 0.19 82.80 0.08 7.00 9.50 INC 
Jammu & Kashmir 0.21 67.16 0.33 13.00 9.40 PDP 
Jharkhand 0.18 66.41 0.19 17.00 39.10 BJP 
Karnataka 0.14 75.36 0.23 10.00 23.60 INC 
Kerala 0.08 94.00 0.49 8.00 12.00 CPIM 
Madhya Pradesh 0.30 91.85 0.24 6.00 36.70 BJP 
Maharashtra 0.08 69.32 0.29 17.00 24.50 BJP 
Manipur 0.20 82.34 0.43 14.00 47.10 INC 
Meghalaya 0.17 79.21 0.06 33.00 17.10 INC 
Mizoram 0.19 74.43 0.38 12.00 21.10 INC 
Nagaland 0.27 91.33 0.42 10.00 20.90 NFP 
Odisha 0.19 79.55 0.21 25.00 37.00 BJD 
Puducherry 0.04 72.87 0.17 15.00 1.20 INC 
Punjab 0.22 85.85 0.41 8.00 15.90 SAD 
Rajasthan 0.21 75.84 0.22 8.00 24.80 BJP 
Sikkim 0.10 66.11 0.02 16.00 13.10 SDF 
Tamil Nadu 0.07 81.42 0.30 8.00 17.10 AIADMK 
Telangana 0.16 80.09 0.14 11.00 
 
TRS 
Tripura 0.23 87.22 0.30 16.00 17.40 CPIM 
Uttar Pradesh 0.10 67.68 0.08 20.00 37.70 SP 
Uttrakhand 0.23 78.82 0.43 9.00 18.00 INC 
West Bengal 0.17 76.26 0.51 17.00 26.70 TMC 
Source: Data compiled by Author from Census (Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2011), Handbook of Indian Economy 
(Reserve Bank of India Various Issues), Planning Commission (2013) 
  
 In terms of electoral support, the JDU had been gaining since early 2000’s when it was in alliance 
with the BJP. The JDU and BJP broke ranks and fought the 2014 election separately. The 2014 parliamentary 
election was the worst performance by the party. It became clear that while the developmental and 
transparent governance under Nitish Kumar was gaining public support, the social basis of JDU was still 
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inadequate for electoral victory. The election results formalised the path to alliance with RJD at the state 
level. 
 
 
Party /Vote 
Share 
2004 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2005 
Assembly 
Election 
2009 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2010 
Assembly 
Election  
2014 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2015 
Assembly 
Election  
JDU 22.4 20.5 24 22.6 16 17.3 
BJP 14.6  15.6 13.9 16.5 29.9 25 
RJD 30.7 23.5 19.3 18.8 20.5 18.8 
Source: (Election Commission of India Various Issues) 
 
 It is noteworthy that in Bihar 5,298 panchayats out of 8,471 panchayats in the state don't have a 
bank branch and the state is one of the poorest in India. Despite the ground realities, the support for 
demonetisation by JDU, and the opposition by RJD highlights the political context of support.  
 Similar political logic underlines the incumbent Biju Janata Dal support for demonetisation in 
Odisha. The BJD is not part of the NDA alliance and Odisha performs poorly in all the objective conditions 
necessary for successful demonetisation. In fact, 47 percent of the population have no access to banking in 
the state. Despite such conditions the support of BJD to demonetization reflects the desire to portray an 
image of honest, and progressive government. It is worth noting that since inception the party has 
proclaims itself as secular and development oriented. Incidentally the BJD was an ally of the BJP in the state 
in the 2000s. The alliance between BJP and BJD broke down in 2009 over seat sharing and incidences of 
communal violence especially in Kandhamal district. 
 
 
Party/ Vote Share 
2000 
Assembly 
Election 
2004 
Assembly 
Election 
2009 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2014  
Assembly 
Election 
2014 
Parliamentary 
Election  
BJD 29.4 27.4 37.2 43.9 44.8 
INC 33.8 34.8 32.7 26 26 
BJP 18.2 17.1 16.9 18.2 21.9 
Source: (Election Commission of India Various Issues) 
 
 As the data suggests the BJD has gained since the breakdown of the alliance with the BJP in the 
state. The BJD support is concentrated in the upper castes and the OBCs along with Dalits and Adivasis. The 
main opposition in the state is the Congress which has been politically discredited in the 2014 election for 
corruption and discrimination against Odisha (Mohanty and Ray 2014). Clearly the BJD is not politically 
opposed to the BJP and developmental honest image of the leader conforms to the support for 
demonetisation. The relation between the BJD-BJP has also remained complicated as BJP central leaders 
have rarely criticised the state Chief Minister (Mohanty 2016). 
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 Like the support of opposition parties, the opposition to demonetization can be explained through 
the logic of politics. The virulent opposition of Delhi Chief Minister Kejriwal to demonetisation can be 
understood in the context of Delhi politics. Delhi is a unique state being the capital of India. The AamAadmi 
Party emerged in the context of anti-corruption movement and projects itself as a party of the masses 
hitherto ignored by the mainstream political parties. The political ascendance of AAP has been at the 
expense of the Congress party and the BJP is the main opposition to the AAP with vote share of 34 percent 
in 2015. Thus despite the relatively favourable conditions on ground, the AAP opposition to demonetisation 
has repeatedly emphasised on problems for the population especially migrant labours, slum dwellers, poor, 
small and medium businessmen, who constitute the support base of the AAP. For AAP the posturing of anti-
corruption is not critical as the party image incorporates anti-corruption (broom being the party election 
symbol).  
 For West Bengak Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, the logic of anti-corruption runs in the opposite 
direction. The TMC has been marred in allegations of corruption since assuming power in the state and 
projecting an anti-corruption image is not a major concern of the regime. Rather the pro-poor image of the 
party and anti-BJP posturing is critical to success of the TMC. The state has around 27.5 percent Muslim 
population and muslims votes are critical in nearly 100 constituencies (more than 30 percent votes) out of 
total 294 in the state (Azim 2016). Even though consolidation of Muslim votes is difficult, anti-BJP 
positioning is the best way to attempt this consolidation. 
 
Party/ 
Vote 
Share 
 2004 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2006 
Assembly 
Election 
2009 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2011 
Assembly 
Election 
2014 
Parliamentary 
Election 
2016 
Assembly 
Election 
Left 
Front  
50.8 50.6 43.3 41.1 30.1 21.7 
TMC 21 26.6 31.2 38.9 39.8 45.6 
INC 14.6 14.7 13.5 9.1 9.7 12.4 
BJP 8.1 1.9 6.1 4.1 17 10.1 
Source: (Election Commission of India Various Issues) 
 
 In the assembly elections in 2016 the Congress received around 12.3 votes (in alliance with Left 
Front) just 2 percent more than BJP’s vote share.  In real terms therefore BJP has emerged as the third 
alternative in the state. Interestingly the BJP vote share declined in 2016, compared to 2014 but this decline 
did not benefit the Left-Congress alliance in a significant way. Instead TMC's vote percentage increased as 
minority votes shifted to TMC as the credible bulwark against the BJP. Also the support base of the TMC has 
largely drawn to rural and urban poor. Its vote share tended to be higher in rural areas, a sign that it has 
replaced the Left as the "provider party" for the rural poor (Vernier 2016). Unsurprisingly Mamata Banerjee 
was most vocal against demonetisation because the principal opposition in the state (CPIM and Congress) 
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opposed the move, and she had to portray herself as a greater, more credible opposition to BJP for the 
minorities and her traditional vote bank. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion it is important to point out that demonetisation and its consequences are still unsure, 
at least economically. The economy has been somewhat destabilised in the short run while the long run 
benefits can only be anticipated. In the absence of credible economic outcomes, the narrative of 
demonetisation constructed by political parties has dominated the discourse. That is why states like Delhi 
and Karnataka despite having comparatively favourable conditions has opposed the move while backward 
states like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar have extended their supported. Despite the economic failures 
politically the move has cemented the position of the government as an effective honest administration 
despite all the pitfalls. The instrumental attitude of the opposition parties towards demonetization has 
meant that the opposite narrative has been fragmented. The response of political parties is guided not only 
by their conception of demonetisation but their electoral interests. In this milieu unsurprisingly electoral 
outcomes or elections have become the metric to measure the success or failure of the decision. In this fluid 
political-economy situation the position of parties is likely to follow the verdict of the people. 
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RESUMO 
Entre 8 de novembro e 31 de dezembro de 2016, o governo indiano instituiu um dos maiores exercícios de 
desmonetização do mundo, retirando 86% de todas as moedas, sob a forma das notas deRs 500 e Rs 1000. 
Este artigo analisa o debate em torno do exercício de desmonetização e tenta fornecer uma narrativa 
política do evento. Interrogando os vários argumentos em torno da desmonetização, argumenta que a 
desmonetização foi reduzida a uma postura política, uma vez que as consequências econômicas continuam a 
ser altamente debatidas. 
Palavras-chave:Desmonetização; Economia política; Índia; 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Between 8th November and 31st December 2016 the Indian government instituted one of the biggest 
demonetisation exercises in the world by withdrawing 86 percent of all currency in the form of Rs 500 and 
Rs 1000 notes. This paper looks at the debate surrounding the demonetisation exercise and attempts to 
provide a political economy narrative of the event. Interrogating the various arguments around 
demonetisation, it argues that demonetisation has been reduced to a political posturing as the economic 
consequences remain highly debated. 
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